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MUNICIPAL STAFF-COUNCIL RELATIONS 
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: 
Examining The Hamilton Gore Park Fiasco 
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Submitted by: Vincent Sferrazza 
#1387968 
Traditional theory holds that politicians establish public 
policy1 and administrators carry it out. Those who study or work 
in local government eventually came to recognize the inconsistency 
and obsolescence of this notion.2 Clearly, politics and 
administration overlap in virtually all municipal governments. 
' Decision making and the implementation of these decisions are 
inseparable parts of the process of public management. In fact, 
one of the most significant factors of successful municipal 
, management is the ongoing relationship between a municipal council 
and its city staff. Decisions are executed and administered 
' through the combined effort of both politicians and public 
administrators. Councillors and staff must work collaboratively 
in order to devise policies and carry out services that satisfy 
their municipal constituents. 
The role of the administrator becomes increasingly 
1 important as issues and problems in the local arena become more 
complex. Contemporary local issues now require the public service 
to function in various capacities. For one, it is necessary that 
1 Policy includes by-laws, budgets and municipal plans and 
projects which make general rules about how people and property are 
treated in similar circumstances. 
2 For a detailed historical description and analysis on the 
evolution of policy-making and administration in Canadian municipal 
government, see Donald J. Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in 
Canada (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Corp., 1986); T.J. 
Plunkett and G.M. Betts, The Management of Canadian Urban 
Government (Kingston: the Institute of Local Government Queen's 
University, 1978); T.J. Plunkett, Urban Canada and its Government: 
a study of municipal organization (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 
i 1968); C.R. Tindal and S. Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada: 
Third edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1990) 
2 
bureaucrats provide councillors with professional and technical 
advice. They are required to have a working knowledge of the law 
and regulations pertinent to a specific policy. In addition, it is 
also the administrator's responsibility to bring apparent problems 
and needs in the municipality to council's attention, and assess 
the feasibility of solutions and suggest alternatives.3 
The purpose of this study is to raise and examine concerns 
regarding the roles and responsibilities of councillors and 
bureaucrats within the policy making and implementation processes. 
The paper will assert that problems will eventually occur if 
expectations are not co-ordinated between and understood by city 
council and the administration. Specifically, if local councillors 
do not prudently assess issues and, correspondingly, if civil 
servants do not act responsibly (it will be discussed later what 
constitutes responsible behaviour) then policy will not be properly 
formulated and delivered. 
When council's relationship with the Chief Administrative 
Officer (CAO) and bureaucrats is poor, the following questions 
might be asked: Has the manager been provided with clear terms of 
reference and objectives? Has an appropriate performance appraisal 
format been developed which ensures that council will provide 
3 While it may not be significantly relevant to the theme of 
this study, it should be mentioned that administrators must also be 
able to manage subordinate staff, equipment and budgets on a day to 
day basis, and remain cognizant of happenings and operations in 
other municipalities and in other levels of governments. Stewart 
Fyfe, "Municipal Government: A Complementary Political System" in 
Politics: Municipal Stvle; A selection of papers on Municipal 
Government in Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Municipal 
affairs, 1989) p.11 
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accurate and ongoing feedback to the CAO concerning his or her 
performance? Can council successfully direct the affairs of the 
community and achieve its own goals and priorities with the 
incumbent CAO and departmental heads?4 
The paper will examine the possible hazards of confrontation 
and the need for co-operation if the municipality is to function 
competently. Although various functional inefficiencies will be 
j-— 
explored,)a single standard for public service behaviour will not 
be proposed. Instead, several theories will be presented because 
there no longer exists a consensus on what it means to be a 
responsible or prudent public servant.^J Clearly, to advocate a 
single principle outlining the specific roles of the bureaucrat is 
to ignore the external circumstances that uniquely influence local 
issues and, hence, preclude the application of a uniform theory.6 
The objective of this paper will be realized by presenting the 
theoretical foundation for staff-council relations at the municipal 
level of government. Prior to featuring various academic 
principles on responsible public service behaviour, the paper will 
focus on a case study examining staff-council relations in the city 
of Hamilton surrounding the Gore Park redevelopment issue. By 
4 T.J. Proulx, "A Team Effort" in Politics; A Municipal Style. 
A Selection of Papers on Municipal Government in Ontario. (Toronto: 
Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1989) p.90 
5 John Langford "Responsibility in the public service: marching 
to several drummers", Canadian Public Administration vol.27 no.4 
(Winter 1984) p.513 
6 Unique external circumstances would include urbanization, 
industrialization, political culture and economic influences 
(public choice and neo-marxist). 
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P investigating what initially went wrong and the subsequent 
repercussions, the study will enhance the understanding of what is 
I required by both politicians and administrators to make the 
•M relationship more productive. 
1 The upcoming case study, involving a park restoration 
P programme in downtown Hamilton, will demonstrate how conflict and 
mistrust can develop when the relationship between city staff and 
J politicians is dysfunctional. The case study will allow us to 
apply theory to a real life situation. By doing so, situations and 
' problems, which may not have been anticipated or appreciated in the 
r theory, are revealed. Although they obviously operate within the 
limits of a specific situation, case studies still support or 
j ^ challenge theoretical information. 
Hamilton Gore Park Rejuvenation Programme 
ESS 
I Introduction 
p Since the 1860's, Gore Park has been a symbol of beauty 
located in the heart of downtown Hamilton. With its majestic 
[ fountain, picturesque greenery and blissful atmosphere, Gore Park 
1 
attracted tourists and citizens to the core of the city. For the 
1 first one hundred years of its existence, the 2.4 hectare (six 
m acre) park7 maintained a consistent character and quality. It was 
a unique oasis of trees and planting in the commercial centre of 
f" the city. However, in 1983 the famous fountain and park was 
| 7 See diagram A for a detailed sketching of Gore Park. The 
( sketching is that of the proposed new design for the park. It 
p serves the purpose of outlining where the park is situated, the 
adjacent streets and its size, which is the author's intention. 
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rebuilt. Unfortunately, the result would be disastrous for both 
the politicians and city staff. 
That year Hamilton's city council approved the implementation 
of the Downtown Action Plan (DAP) . The goal of the plan was to 
revamp Hamilton's downtown sector, with the first phase of the plan 
comprising of Gore Park renovations. The usefulness of Gore Park 
as a park was seriously eroded. The original fountain had been 
replaced on several occasions by more dramatic ones that seemed 
inappropriate, diminishing space for grass and plants. 
Furthermore, increasingly heavy traffic on both sides of the park 
and the intensive use of its south edge as a bus interchange 
contributed to the park's deterioration. The park's significance 
as a meeting place, tourist attraction and symbol of vitality in 
Hamilton also began to diminish. 
The importance of Gore Park to the centre of downtown Hamilton 
was recognized in the DAP. This report proposed that Gore Park 
should be restored to its role as the centrepiece of downtown 
Hamilton, and defined the principles in redeveloping the park. The 
new park plan and its implementation, however, raised serious 
questions and concerns about the relationship between the 
politicians and the administrator. It also highlighted how serious 
communcation gaps developed between the city staff and city council 
when no or minimal discussion was initiated. Furthermore, the 
question of administrative responsiveness and accountability to 
politicians and the electorate was under scrutiny. 
I 6 
P The Players 
The city of Hamilton operates according to the Council-Chief 
| Administrative Officer organizational model.8 Many departments and 
m committee personnel were involved in the Gore Park fiasco and 
1 subsequently underwent considerable scrutiny.9 Within the city 
P administrative staff, the CAO, Mr. Lou Sage, received extensive 
criticism for his handling of the situation. His responsibilities 
I included co-ordinating all the department heads and their 
functions, and managing over two thousand employees and a budget 
i over one hundred million dollars. The Director of Community 
p Development, Mr. Ed Kowalski, was also heavily scrutinized. In 
addition to his responsibilities as director, Mr. Kowalski was 
] > appointed chairman of the project team implementing the park's new 
design. While in this capacity he reported directly to Mr. Sage 
1 and, before anything could be implemented, Mr. Kowalski needed the 
p CAO's approval and consent. The department's primary 
responsibility involved city rehabilitation programs and continuous 
) interaction and dealings with various city private commerce and 
business organizations. This department prepared the necessary 
I information for restoration programs and reports any program 
m implementation suggestions to the Planning and Development 
Committee. 
8 For a description of this and other municipal administrative 
r models see Donald J. Higgins Local and Urban Politics in Canada, 
(Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing Company, 1986) 
p 9 See diagram B for an organizational chart of all the players 
involved. 
P Theoretically, the department's responsibilities and 
recommendations regarding the implementation of a program must meet 
( approval from the Planning and Development Committee. Moerover, 
pa the CAO is ultimately responsible for overseeing the operations of 
all departments. Therefore, any reports which are sent from 
F Community Development to the Planning and Development Committee are 
inspected by an agenda review committee10. Mr. Sage is to be made 
I aware of what will be distributed to that committee for 
consideration. All matters that may be relevant to the 
1 administrative process are reported to the CAO. In reality, only 
p crucial incidents necessitate Mr. Kowalski and the department to 
report to Mr. Sage and city councillors. Mr. Kowalski was granted 
JEM? 
^ the authority to make decisions on routine issues without 
communicating to council and the CAO. When exceptional problems 
I presented themselves Mr. Kowalski was obligated to inform the 
p politicians and Mr. Sage and solicit their counsel in handling the 
situation. 
I The political groups which received harsh criticism were the 
standing committees of City Council. The Planning and Development 
1 Committee - then chaired by Bill McCulloch - was responsible for 
m recommending policy to council and overseeing activities of the 
planning department and the department of Community Development. 
F This standing committee recommended to council changes in the 
draft plans for sub-divisions, zoning changes, and site plans. 
10 This committee made up of bureacrats served primarily in a 
cursory manner. It was also a means of informing all the 
departmental heads on a projects developments. 
[ 8 
pin 
Moreover, the entire downtown redevelopment project would be under 
the committee's supervision. The other committee directly involved 
j with the Gore Park issue was the Parks and Recreation Committee 
m chaired by Brian Hinkley. The main functions of the committee were 
to advise council on the need for parks and recreation facilities 
P and their location in the city. In addition, the management and 
maintenance of all parks, open spaces and recreation facilities was 
j under the auspices of the committee. Hamilton's city council 
— would also be subject to substantial abuse. What would be made 
' evident and publicized during this ordeal was the lack of 
F" communication between the staff members, and standing committees, 
city council and the citizens. 
[ ^ The beginning of the Gore Park programme 
The idea of renovating Gore Park can be traced back to 1981; 
' to a period when the downtown area was constantly deteriorating. 
P1 City Council was concerned that many businesses had abandoned King 
Street East, leaving empty storefronts, and amusement arcades and 
fast-food outlets in their wake. On January 13, 1981 city council 
adopted a "Central Area Plan" (CAP) which established policies and 
I guidelines with respect to both planning and development activities 
p within the central area of the city, thereby providing the 
foundation for determining the direction of downtown 
] improvements.11 The need for this project was also to stop and 
reverse the closing of small businesses in downtown Hamilton 
11 The Corporation of the City of Hamilton. Downtown Action 
Plan Co-ordinating Committee. (Hamilton: February 2, 1983) p.2 
pHl 
pw^ 
9 
P resulting in loss of assessment and taxation. Subsequently 
implementation of the features of CAP were examined and discussed 
I among the members of the Central Area Co-ordinating and 
™, Implementation Liaison Committee (C.A.C.I.L.C), a committee 
■ comprising of both city and Regional officials and representatives 
F" from the public and business community, which met on numerous 
occasions throughout 1981. Through these discussions it became 
RBI 
| apparent to all that critical measures were needed to improve 
downtown Hamilton, particulary the area on King street, east of 
' James street.12 
p It was recommended, by the C.A.C.I.L.C., that consultants be 
retained to review the current conditions, set priorities, 
establish proposed actions, and prepare a reasonably concrete and 
comprehensive plan of action to ensure downtown revitalization.13 
The city council's intention was for the consultant to determine 
p> whether the park area could be maintained as retail and greenery 
area or whether it should be abandoned for commercial activity such 
P as banks and office towers. If it were to remain a retail area, 
the questions to be resolved were: What kind of beautifying 
i activities should take place to Gore Park? What type of promotions 
mn should occur in the park? What should be done about the traffic? 
In December, 1982 a tender for the project was issued. 
Ultimately, the firm duToit Associates Ltd. was employed by city 
council to prepare a "Downtown Action Plan". The study team co-
n Ibid., p.2 
13 Ibid. 
10 
ordinated by duToit Associates included the firm of D.I. Research 
marketing consultants and Barton-Aschman traffic consultants. A 
steering committee comprising City and Regional staff and community 
business merchants directed the study.14 Before hiring duToit 
Associates, communications and co-ordination between the committees 
was lacking. Consequently, this caused a serious misunderstanding 
over the principal issues surrounding the restoration project. All 
parties involved had envisioned a plan for the park but could not 
reach a consensus on how to coordinate and achieve their goals. 
The purpose of the study was to clarify any misconceptions and 
recommend steps of implementation.15 
During the course of the month long study, two public meetings 
were held for information and feedback purposes in June and 
September of 1982. The meetings were sparingly attended by the 
public with the downtown merchants constituting the majority in 
attendance. Unfortunately, that would be the only time the public 
would be solicited for consultation on the construction of the new 
Gore Park. 
The Plan is Developed 
The "Downtown Action Plan" was developed to improve a large 
part of downtown Hamilton (between James Street and Wellington 
Street) at a cost in excess of $6 400 000. The central focus of 
the plan was the conceptual Streetscape Master Plan for the Gore 
Park area with the estimated gross cost of implementation being 
14 Ibid. . p. 3 
15 Ibid. 
11 
r $2 873 866. 
The aim of the consultant's plan was to make the downtown area 
{ more people oriented. A proposal was initiated to erect an 
p, "informal," green-house style restaurant, and a tourist/shoppers 
' information booth. Other suggestions were that the sidewalks be 
P widened with interlocking bricks, areas be designated for lawns, 
l 
shrubs and flowers. The focal point of the park would be a major 
I sculptural fountain with a waterfall and pool area.16 The 
objective of the Gore Park renovations was to make the area more 
' attractive by shifting the priority from automotive traffic to a 
p pedestrian oriented environment with open space. 
Reaction to the Downtown Action Plan was mixed. Some 
merchants, were sceptical that any development would be helpful, 
and disappointed to see the greenery replaced with concrete. 
1 Others - primarily those proprietors adjacent to the park -
p welcomed the renovations as they anticipated such benefits as 
increased business from the new park design.17 A great deal of 
pressure came from these downtown businesses. They did not want 
Gore Park to remain a haven for destitute and homeless people. 
I They were also complaining that the City was accomplishing very 
m little for the area east of James Street on King Street. The 
businesses which endorsed the Action Plan lobbied city council to 
P implement the duToit recommendations. 
16 Mark Hallman, "Action Plan for Downtown Wins Support" 
Hamilton Spectator. 16 December, 1982 p.A7 
17 Ibid. 
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P Public sentiment concerning the Downtown Action Plan was also 
mixed. Objection to some of the proposals arose from the War 
j Veterans Association. They declared that the area around the 
m, cenotaph was sacred ground, that its location should never be 
altered, and that at least three hundred veterans were prepared to 
p protest any major construction work near the war monument.18 
i 
Consequently, the cenotaph and the other monuments would remain in 
I their existing location. Anthony Butler, chairman of the Local 
_ Architectural Conservation Advisory Committee (LACAC), voiced his 
' disapproval of the proposal that King Street be used as a major 
F" arterial roadway.19 
Approval to the duToit proposals was generally based on the 
rs I economic and aesthetic advantages and benefits that the renovations 
could bring. Supportive newspaper editorials commented on the 
1 necessity of implementing the plan to improve and complement other 
p downtown restoration plans and demonstrate commitment to supporting 
the downtown businesses.20 
While the opinions of the local business establishments were 
taken into consideration, other local groups were not offered 
similar treatment. The design had elicited responses from the 
m Hamilton Historical Board and LACAC but city council did not ask 
18 "Statues shall not be moved", Hamilton Spectator 21 
September 1982 p.A7 
" "Park Facelift plan is called too expensive", Hamilton 
Spectator 23 September, 1982 p. A7 
20 "we've come a long way", editorial Hamilton Spectator 12 
October 1982 p.A5 
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I these groups to comment on the design of the proposed changes to 
the Hamilton Gore, except for the changes proposed for the Gore 
I Park fountain. This omission proved to be problematic since these 
m> groups would have assisted council in measuring the city's 
heterogenous demands and interests. 
P Stage It Political Approval and new Committee Formation 
i ■ 
The first stage of approval was a presentation to the Planning 
| and Development, and Parks and Recreation Committees in December, 
„ in which all alderman were invited to attend. Both committees 
^ embraced the duToit study and confidently approved it, thus 
P advancing it to the second stage of implementation. On January 11, 
L 
1983 the plan was introduced to city council for debate and voting. 
| On this date City council would reach a consensus and adopt the 
following motion: 
' That the conceptual Streetscape Master Plan-Gore Park Area-
Long term Plan and Phasing Plan be approved in principle by 
r council; that funding for implementation of the conceptual 
1 Streetscape Master Plan -Gore Park Area- be referred to the 
Capital budget committee.21 
I Only two councillors opposed - alderman Jim Bethune because he was 
concerned about moving buses off the south leg of King Street, and 
[ alderman Don Grey because he doubted substantial results would 
p develop from the plan. 
At the same meeting, council also approved - with little 
I debate - a recommendation by Mr. Sage and the planning and 
development committee to "direct the director of community 
! ^ development to coordinate the implementation of the DAP and the 
21 Downtown Action Plan, p.3 
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P expedite the first phase of the plan".22 For a variety of 
reasons, none of which had anything to do with Mr. Kowalski's 
[ appointment to head the co-ordinating committee, five alderman 
p opposed the recommendation. To assist in implementation and 
expedite the first phase of the plan, a Downtown Action Plan Co-
P ordination Committee (DAP-COMM) comprising of senior administrative 
staff from key departments directly involved with municipal capital 
j works projects and representatives from businesses of the Downtown 
™ Business Improvement Area, was created at the suggestion of Mr. 
Sage. City staff included administrators from Community 
P Development, Hamilton Street Railway, Parks and Recreation, Public 
Works division, Regional Engineering, Traffic and Planning 
rs | departments. No politicians were assigned to sit on this 
committee, an omission which later proved to be a mistake. 
At this point the communication gap between City staff and 
r City Council emerged that would lead to continuous problems for 
both groups. With no elected representatives contributing to the 
[ redevelopment effort, the bureaucrats began to control the levers 
of production which eventually led to the demise of effective 
\ communication channels. Mr. Sage points out that the committee was 
p formed quickly and set into its task immediately because the 
council had given him the impression that the job-creation aspect 
of the project was as crucial as the resulting new parkland.23 
22 Florence Sicoli, "Gore Park: Our civic triangle has been 
under attack for years but the latest disaster tops them all" 
Hamilton Spectator. 23 October 1983, p.Bl 
23 Ibid 
15 
P Perpetuating the administration's control on the project was 
duToit's proclamation in a letter to city planner, David Godley,24 
I that in order to cut costs and remain within the budgets financial 
ms limits, all work should be in-house. Yet, it also stated that the 
: city staff was not sufficiently qualified to handle the entire 
H project, thus it recommended that a professional consultant be 
hired for at least the first two phases of the DAP.25 City 
i architect David Freeman and other staff members agreed with the 
p letter's first suggestion to reduce costs; if necessary, 
appropriate consulting services would be utilized on a per diem 
f basis.26 duToit estimated it would cost $84 000 in fees for 
[ 
minimal on-site supervision by his firm. Essentially it was 
arranged that the DAP-COMM would prepare detailed, 
redevelopment/design documents. Where appropriate, various senior 
staff, other than Committee members, would attend meetings to 
provide expertise on specific issues. Mr. Sage explained that it 
was not unusual that he and the staff co-ordinating committee - not 
council - decided city staff would interpret the duToit plan and 
prepare designs and construction drawings. Several alderman agreed 
with Mr. Sage's decision to use in-house staff for implementation 
of the project. " 
24 See appendix C for the contents of the letter. 
25 This letter was distributed among the committee members but 
was never turned over to an elected official. 
26 Sicoli, "Gore Park", p.Bl 
" Ibid. 
Formulating a new park design 
Within the next two months the coordination committee and city 
staff prepared detailed design documents. The city staff officials 
in charge of the designs were chosen from the city and the 
Hamilton-Wentworth region. City staff participants came from 
Community Development, the Parks division, the Public Works, 
Traffic department and the city architect. Regional involvement 
came from the Engineering department. Representatives from the 
downtown BIA were also invited to contribute ideas for the parks' 
new design.28 It is interesting to note that the planning 
department - which participated in initial conceptual stages - was 
omitted from creating the final designs. According to city planner 
David Godley the failure to include the planning department was a 
grave error. Until the final stages, the planning department had 
been extensively involved in designing the new Gore Park and was 
cognizant of the community's desires for the park. The department 
believed that they had a better feel for what the community 
wanted.29 Eventually, the new design was completed, encompassing 
28 Bob Martin of the Business Improvement Area group said that 
the business proprietors had a lot to say about where the 
pedestrian paving stones and loading zones would be located. But, 
he says, he was told by Mr. Kowalski that he could not influence 
the actual design of the buildings. Mr. Kowalski's response to 
that was that the details were the concern only of such technical 
people as the architect and the electrical engineers. Sicoli, 
"Gore Park" p.B2 
Mr. Martin also submitted that notwithstanding two specific 
requests for additional information on the detail design of the 
various components of the development, he did not receive anything 
more than the plan dated March 1983 which is what the committee and 
City Council would receive. 
29 Personal Interview with David Godley 24 June 1991 
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r a contemporary theme to coincide with adjacent surrounding modern 
architecture. At the appropriate time, reports were sent to 
various City and Regional Committees requesting technical 
m approval. 
^ The final design which evolved from the duToit study was 
F different in many respects.30 The new features included were a 
concession pavilion, a display pavilion, washroom entrance 
J renovations, reflecting pool/ice area, a fountain amphitheatre, 
sculptural fountain and repaving the surface area with concrete and 
' brick. The design intended to maximize pedestrian mobility and, 
P at the same time, utilize the existing facilities within the 
area.31 The notion of creating an open, people oriented 
j environment seemed altered from duToit's conceptual design, but, 
according to David Godley, the new design would create the 
I aforementioned environment.32 
p The final plans were endorsed by both the Parks and 
Recreation and Planning and Development committees. At the latter 
| committee meeting, Mr. Kowalski and Don Keba of the city 
architect's department did not highlight the differences between 
{ duToit's concept plan and staff plans. Mr. Kowalski reported that 
p the recommended design "[had] evolved from the duToit plan through 
30 See appendix D for the original duToit concept design submitted 
to the city of Hamilton in January, 1983 
31 The Corporation of the City of Hamilton. Downtown Action Plan 
Co-Ordinatina Committee 2 September, 1983 
32 Interview, David Godley 
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P the planning refinement process."33 
On April 26 1983, the plan was presented to city council along 
{ with proposals for construction deadlines which were rapidly 
am approaching. City council approved the report with only a few 
1 councillors voting against the project proposals. According to Mr. 
p Hinkley there seemed to be unanimous support for the redevelopment 
concept plan.34 It was also agreed that there would be continuous 
| consultations with the Hamilton Veterans Association to ensure that 
its concerns with respect to the area surrounding the cenotaph were 
■ considered. Council told the Co-ordinatining Committee and city 
F" staff to implement and expedite the plans.35 There were relatively 
few enquiries into the design of the new park at the council 
j A meetings from the politicians and bureaucrats who were present. 
Incidently, those citizens in attendance at the council meetings 
I demonstrated strong support for the project and council's approval 
p decision. The proposed budget was given approval and the contract 
for construction was awarded to Dufferin Construction. Meanwhile, 
Mr. Kowalski's department sent out news releases to downtown 
merchants, announcing that there would be a domed food concession 
I pavilion and an open pavilion set aside for displays. with the 
m commencement of construction, in the summer of 1983, came the 
inevitable problems with respect to implementing the plan. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Personal interview Brian Hinkley, 24 June, 1991 
35 The Corporation of the City of Hamilton. Meeting of the Council 
11 January, 1983 
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The problems with implementation 
In July, city and regional parks maintenance crews began 
cutting down trees in order to make room for the new structures. 
The public responded by demanding an explanation to this action, 
and outrage followed. The Hamilton Spectator printed many 
articles, which incited the people to react. The central location 
and high visibility of the park exacerbated the resulting problems. 
Moreover, the manner in which the job was completed raised many 
questions. First, there was absolutely no debate or public forum 
to discuss the necessity of tree cutting. Second, no authorization 
was rendered by city council. The politicians did not receive any 
information that the park renovations involved chopping down the 
fifty year old trees. Furthermore, there were conflicting opinions 
on whether the trees could have been salvaged. The city's arborist 
claimed that it was not necessary to cut down the trees, claiming 
that the redevelopment plan could have been completed with the 
trees intact.36 City Architect David Freeman indicated that new 
trees would be planted to replace the disposed ones. In spite of 
this concession, outrage persisted as the information regarding the 
tree-cutting had been initially withheld. The fact that council 
had given city staff the discretionary power to make decisions was 
apparent in this specific incident. However, this power should not 
have precluded council-staff communications and public debate. 
After the aforementioned controversy had subsided, 
construction continued throughout the summer and early autumn. 
36 Personal interview Mr. Lou Sage 19 June, 1991 
p*\ 
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Gradually, the concrete structures began to take form, and so, 
again, did public and council discontent. By October it became 
abundantly clear that the redeveloped park would be engrossed with 
oversized, concrete edifices. Public outcry grew in intensity as 
representatives from local conservation groups and downtown 
merchants voiced their dissatisfaction. 
Their major contentions were that the constructed pavilions 
had distorted the park's green environment, and that the original 
, plans were not faithfully implemented.37 The degree of revisions 
and the subsequent change in budget distribution to account for the 
' changes prompted a review of the project. Architect Anthony 
Butler, speaking on behalf of the Hamilton Historical Board, had 
demanded that an immediate reassessment of the Gore Park project be 
> undertaken to determine if the project had deviated from the duToit 
Study. Mr. Butler stated that, in his view, and that of the 
' Historical Board, the development was not consistent and in 
accordance with the "site plan" concept as outlined in the January 
11, 1983 Downtown Action Plan prepared by Roger duToit. He 
ascertained that the restaurant/cafe facility was not included in 
the original concept and was merely a suggestion for future 
* consideration. Moreover, the display pavilion in the cenotaph area 
had been included by staff members and was grossly oversized, thus 
obstructing the westward view.38 
37 "Downtown Hamilton will bloom again", Toronto Star, 2 6 October 
1983 p.A7 
38 The Corporation of the City of Hamilton, Parks and Recreation 
Committee Report 13 October, 1983. p.l 
B^l 
JB^ 
I 
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The Downtown BIA was most impressed with the speed that civic 
staff had implemented the plan. Nevertheless, it was extremely 
concerned with some of the its characteristics. Mr. B. Martin, 
Executive Director of the association, recommended that the 
pavilions be removed. However, he stressed to the staff committees 
that, while his organization favoured stopping pavilion 
construction so as to review the plans, it was not recommending any 
delay with the implementation of the remaining aspects of the 
DAP.39 
Politicians serving on the respective committees began to 
question the plans that evolved from the consultants' study. Jim 
Bethune called the buildings too overpowering and urged the present 
plans be abolished and the project be restarted.40 Alderman Mike 
Davison said "when council approved the plans in April, no one told 
me this Greek temple display area would be built of white plastic 
stucco or that the concession would be an eye-offending blue 
fibreglass11.41 However, there was no consensus among the 
politicians and bureaucrats about whether to finish the project and 
then modify its appearance or halt the completion and start over. 
Mr. Sage did not believe that complete destruction of the buildings 
was necessary. He endorsed the plan of completing the work and 
then assessing the final results. From there, changes could have 
39 The Corporation of the City of Hamilton, Parks and Recreation 
Committee meeting minutes, exhibit 30 19 October 1983 p.la 
40 Bill Johnston, "Furor raised over Gore Park design" Hamilton 
Spectator 14 October, 1983 p. A7 
41 Ibid. 
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P been made. In his opinion, the differences in the staff design and 
the duToit concept were relatively minor. However other opinions 
\ varied and many were diametrically antithetical to Mr. Sage's. 
nm At this point, council decided to ask Mr. duToit if his 
* original concept for the park had been misinterpreted or deviated 
f™ from altogether. Interestingly, Mr. duToit unequivocally stated 
that the reality differed from the initial plans. "The main lesson 
j to be learned is one of continuity. There was a break in 
continuity from the people who conceived the design on the new park 
and those who implemented the design."42 Furthermore, he asserted 
p that another issue is not whether it is different but whether it 
is appropriate for the downtown surroundings. He also asserted 
A that additional problems arose because of the omission of the city 
Planning Department which was critical to the coordination of the 
1 first part of the study. According to Mr. duToit, no one in the 
f* implementation stage had given much thought to whether the final 
construction drawings were faithful to the concepts and designs 
| included in the original plans.43 "There's a chance now to go 
back to the point where the continuity was broken", declared Mr. 
I duToit, adding that he would like the chance to finish the project 
m himself.44 Incidently, Mr. duToit's firm was originally only hired 
to provide a broad concept for the park and its involvement ceased 
P at that point. 
r 42 Florence Sicoli "Gore Park" p.Bl 
( N 43 Ibid. 
44 Sicoli, Florence, "Gore Park" p.B2 
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P A closed meeting was scheduled for Monday October 17, 1983 to 
review the Hamilton Gore issue. The purpose of the meeting was to 
I review options which could be implemented to resolve the problems 
p*, in the Hamilton Gore. This meeting was attended by City of 
Hamilton Staff, representatives from the LACAC group and the 
P Hamilton Historical Board, the Business Improvement Management 
Committee and Downtown Business Association. Formulated options 
J were to be presented soon after at a special meeting of the Parks 
and Recreation Committee. The debate to determine the feasibility 
' of the project continued for some time until the Parks and 
p Recreation, and Planning and Development Committees passed a motion 
on Wednesday October 19, 1983 to halt construction because it had 
sharply departed from what was expected on January 11, 1983, when i 
city council approved the duToit concept. With the exception of 
the walking areas, a proposal was rendered by the standing 
committees to stop construction in Gore park.45 
On November 1, 1983, one month from completion of the 
restoration, city council approved the proposal to halt 
construction and ordered that all the structures be demolished. 
Close to $1.8 million had been committed to the ill-fated 
reconstruction of Gore Park, leaving city councillors little room 
to manoeuvre in salvaging the project. Mayor Bob Morrow said it 
was imperative that council rejuvenate the downtown within the $2.8 
million budgeted for the project, as long as all costs are 
45 The Corporation of the City of Hamilton Parks and Recreation 
Committee Report l November, 1983 
P subjected to close scrutiny.46 It was then recommended that a 
landscape architect be hired to continue the project in 
| collaboration with politicians, staff members and community 
™, representatives. The costs for changing the $2 million project 
' were projected at a minimum of $319 000. The funding would be 
P diverted from other projects of the DAP. From this point on, the 
politicians would play a more interventionist role. 
j Serious questions emerged as to the policy approval and 
implementation processes, and the evaluation of the project. Why 
' did the project receive minimal scrutiny from politicians when it 
p was first introduced to council? Was city council actually given 
all the necessary information throughout the entire project? Did 
^ city council probe deeply enough when questions may not have been 
sufficiently answered or issues left unexplained? Why did the 
1 stoppage of the park renovations occur with only one month left 
p before final completion? Furthermore, why was city staff given 
unrestricted authority without any evaluative mechanism or 
political intervention? 
The revised plan under attack 
( As previously mentioned, a serious discrepancy emerged between 
«m the original conceptual plan and the staff's revisions. The 
Downtown Action Plan recommended a major sculptural waterfall 
P fountain with an adjacent amphitheatre. The amount in the cost 
schedule for this facility was $200 000. The major waterfall 
46 Hallman, Mark "Keep Gore cost within budget, Morrow says", 
Hamilton Spectator. 5 November 1983 p.A5 
fountain was not constructed and the secondary amphitheatre had 
been enlarged to a 300 seat primary amphitheatre at a construction 
cost of $220 000. Areas for future small water fountains had been 
allocated to the west of the amphitheatre and to the east of the 
food concession pavilion. No sculptural fountains had been 
provided for in the construction contract. Similarly, no cost 
information was made available for the construction work in the 
contract which related to future fountains structures. 
The DAP recommended that a feasibility study be conducted to 
determine the need for such facilities in the Hamilton Gore. Such 
a study was never undertaken. No cost allowance was included in 
the DAP cost analysis schedule. No provision was made for a 
display pavilion in the original plan; however, this was changed by 
the staff which ultimately would have incurred a cost of over 
$100 000. Although duToit recommended that only a restaurant be 
considered, City architect David Freeman included a food outlet 
because he thought there was a consensus that it would be a strong 
attraction to help make the park a "people place".47 Finally, 170 
new trees over and above the existing trees were to be initially 
planted, with a budget of $85 000, according to the duToit study. 
The altered plans would have provided 71 trees at a cost of $2 0 
000. Alderman Bethune had inquired as to why the final working 
drawings were not submitted to the Parks and Recreation Committee 
for final approval. Mr. Kowalski advised that the Coordinating 
47 Florence Sicoli and Bill Johnston "Whodunit", Hamilton Spectator. 
22 October, 1983, p.A7-A8 
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P Committee proceed with the implementation as directed by City 
Council. He also insisted that it was not the practise to submit 
i detailed working drawings to the committee for approval prior to 
am implementation on any of the other park development projects his 
department was involved in.48 
F"1 Fiasco Explanations 
A primary consideration that deserves attention is determining 
[ where the jurisdictional responsibility for Gore Park actually 
™ fell. At the committee level, it has already been established that 
1 the entire downtown project was the responsibility of the Planning 
P and Development Committee. Yet, it also resided under the auspices 
of the Parks and Recreation Committee because technically it was a 
I park with greenery. Therefore, the latter committee administered 
the aspects of the plan that involved the "greenery", and Planning 
and Development handled the other areas. The separation of duties 
proved to be considerably problematic. The two committees failed 
to integrate their duties in a harmonious fashion and there was a 
lack of communication with staff. One way of avoiding these 
problems would have been to develop a project committee comprising 
of city staff and politicians. This project management committee 
would co-ordinate the complete park restoration project and all 
essential information would circulate through them. It would serve 
as a central database for the politicians and city staff. It would 
also eliminate the confusion over who would be responsible for what 
48 Parks and Recreation Committee Report 19 October, 1983 p.la 
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areas.49 
The Gore Park fiasco developed because the entire project was 
rushed and poorly scrutinized. One reason for this was that at the 
time decisions were being made, Hamilton City Hall was working with 
a relatively new Council. There were a number of changes in this 
new Council, specifically, there was a recent addition of seven new 
councillors. This contributed to the park fiasco because local 
politicians coming into office for the first time may have no 
previous experience or training at the management or policy-making 
level. If such is the case, he or she usually has a completely 
inaccurate perception of their prescribed role. Moreover, the 
councillor "has no political party to guide him through the shoals 
of bureaucratic manipulation, information overload or conflicting 
advice.1'50 
Furthermore, the motives of the council were directed towards 
economic recovery. The impetus behind council's decision to begin 
park reconstruction, was partially economic - to create jobs, 
virtually at all costs. Any projects undertaken were initiated and 
pushed through relatively quickly. City Council had to do 
something for the area east of James Street because they had 
started a number of projects west of James Street along King 
Street. It was clearly evident that city council wanted to serve 
and help the downtown business sector as well as the unemployed. 
49 A project management committee is now created for every major 
project. 
50 Allan O'Brien, Council-Manager Relationships p.5 
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Similarly, the city politicians were driven by self interests. 
Specifically, the prestige and prominence of the council members 
would be heightened if they were recognized as those who helped 
alleviate the effects of the current recession and revitalize 
downtown Hamilton. 
City council's first reaction after the fiasco was the 
recognition that they had delegated too much of its responsibility 
to a committee of civil servants. Mayor Bob Morrow directly stated 
that council gave too much power to the staff. Furthermore, he 
claimed that council approved the staff's designs without 
recognizing the ramifications of what was being recommended. He 
claimed that council must have greater control over major planning 
projects. He further recommended an organization based along a 
board of control or an executive committee.51 The absence of a 
! politician on the Downtown Action Plan Co-Ordinating Committee 
p exacerbated the lack of communication. Politicians also protested 
against the fact that no maps or plans went to council when it 
approved the staff plans for the park on April 26, 1983. According 
to the mayor, none of the politicians asked for detailed plans or 
! models and the staff deemed it unnecessary to provide council with 
(iw any such plans.52 In addition, no model of the proposed Gore Park 
i 
revitalization concept was ever made, as would normally have been 
] the case in other city building projects, because city staff were 
i 
told to get the project completed in 1983. 
FP1 
r 
pw 
51 Personal interview with Robert M.Morrow 26 July, 1991 
52 Ibid. 
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r In retrospect, Mr. Freeman believed it would have been 
expedient to illustrate to the politicians the differences between 
\ the duToit and staff plans. But he added, without a model it would 
p still have been difficult for council members to perceive what the 
project would look like.53 Mr. Kowalski attested to the fact that 
P the plans indicated to council exactly what was going to be done to 
the park. Yet, he qualified this statement saying "looking back, 
| if it was going to be a concern now (about the buildings) , maybe to 
_ highlight the differences would have been good."54 The chairman of 
' the Parks and Recreation Committee, Brian Hinkley, asserted that 
P the plans did not make it clear what the finished park would look 
I 
like. However, he also noted that many of the councillors 
I ^ perceived problems but did not voice any complaints or inquires.55 
The chairman of the Planning and Development Committee, alderman 
Bill McCulloch said he opposed the park plan from the start. But, 
p he kept out of the picture, so as not to conflict with the wishes 
of the area business people, whom he assumed were monitoring the 
progress of the renovations. 
One incident which effectively described the staff's wrongful 
non-disclosure of information and city council's apparent 
p indifference was the issue surrounding the total costs of hiring of 
53 Mr. Freeman asserts the construction of a model would have taken 
at least one month to complete, thus prolonging the completion 
date. However, LACAC member Howard Mark disagrees with this and 
claims two to three weeks would be sufficient time for constructing 
a model. Sicoli, "Gore Park", p.B2 
M Ibid. 
55 Ibid. p.Bl 
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r duToit consultants. When Council approved the duToit concept in 
January 1983, the firm's expenditures were not revealed. In a 
! letter from John Hillier of duToit to David Godley of Hamilton's 
jm Planning Department, dated November, 1982, these costs were 
outlined. Mr. Hillier stated that all the design work, preparation 
P* of construction drawings and supervision for the site could be done 
by duToit for six per cent of the construction costs. Furthermore 
j the Region received seven per cent of the administrative costs of 
_ the project, plus almost $80 000 for engineering and inspections. 
' Mr. Godley gave the letter to a staff committee under Lou Sage in 
P December 1982. The letter was also reviewed by another staff 
i 
committee under the direction of Ed Kowalski, who was to implement 
the concept.56 city council learned of the letter and its contents 
in December 1983. They also learned of the Region's fees in 
1 October of that year. Therefore, during this time Gore Park had 
P1 been renovated and then demolished, yet council was unaware of some 
important costs. The actual reasons for this mistake were never 
made public. The questions of why this important information was 
withheld from Council and why Council did not investigate before 
I making further decisions, still remain. 
p Throughout the planning stages of the designs, the two 
standing committees agreed to the staff proposals and remained 
j politically detached, based on the knowledge that the redevelopment 
plans were acceptable to the BIA and the professional staff. From 
56 Bill Johnston, "City politicians to prove to staff decisions on 
park", Hamilton Spectator, 31 December, 1983 p. A6 
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a superficial standpoint, it seemed as if council approved and 
cooperated with the wishes of the public. However, city council 
did not know all of the consequences of their actions, and, thus, 
blindly rendered a decision. The city politicians blamed the city 
staff for not providing all the relevant information and for not 
emphasizing the concept changes in the plans. Yet, it was clear 
that the city councillors were willing to expedite the project so 
as to improve the employment situation in the city and avoid any 
hostility among the downtown merchants who were experiencing 
slumping retail sales. 
Politicians have three basic responsibilities: to assess the 
expectations of the citizen's diverse interests; to make 
responsible decisions that take this assessment into consideration; 
and to ensure that their decisions are carried out without any 
significant alterations by staff.57 Evaluating how city council 
fulfilled these duties indicates that it did not effectively 
accomplish its role. 
The first responsibility was partly achieved. The downtown 
businesses represented the major stakeholder in the areas being 
developed. However other groups such as the heritage and 
conservation group and previously mentioned interest groups were 
not afforded similar appreciation by council. Therefore, 
politicians failed in realizing the second responsibility. The 
final responsibility was poorly executed. Council was never 
m 
certain of what the final project would look like and, 
57 Fyfe, "Municipal Government" p. 6 
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P consequently, never continued with any systematic consultations on 
v 
the plan's implementation. 
[ The misunderstanding of the project and the somewhat apathetic 
«, reaction to the construction of the new structures suggests that 
council members did not perform their job diligently. It was 
P council's decision to allow the staff to implement its Downtown 
Action Plan and terminate duToit's services, partly to save $84 000 
dollars in consulting fees. Council failed to appoint a political 
_ sub-committee to oversee Community Development Director Ed Kowalski 
' and his staff committee which was directed by council on January 11 
P to "implement and expedite" the duToit concept. A primary reason 
for this was the dominant belief amongst politicians in City Hall 
^ that politicians should be kept at arm's length because of their 
apparent ignorance and lack of understanding pertaining to 
i technical matters. 
p It was the politicians' role to approve the conceptual plans, 
budget and final plans while the staff professionals handled the 
central elements of the project. According to alderman Hinkley 
previous city councils were condemned by the public for interfering 
I with matters outside their area of responsibility.58 However, if 
p the onus was on the staff to inform council of the parks progress, 
the onus was also on each and every council member to investigate 
P and determine what was happening. Moreover, it is a councillor's 
duty to sufficiently study the plans. Only two alderman did not 
[ sit on either the Parks and Recreation or Planning and Development 
58 interview Hinkley 
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committees, both of which had direct access to the plans. There is 
no reason why concerned council members or downtown business people 
interested in the project could not have been more thorough and 
inquisitive when assessing the plans. When the community became 
outraged with the construction developments, it had provided the 
councillors with a justification for becoming directly involved. 
According to some aldermen, council did not show any concern about 
the Gore Park plan until community groups expressed their 
dissatisfaction.59 
The bureaucracy's handling of the implementation indicated 
minimal collaboration with council. The interpretation of the 
duToit concept was a case in point in that staff showed little 
willingness to explain coherently the fundamental details and 
alterations from the original conceptual design. The overseeing 
committee failed to inform the politicians and the downtown 
businessmen of the major differences, thereby failing in carrying 
out their job. Actually, the final site plan submitted to the 
Parks and Recreation Committee did NOT detail any revisions with 
respect to the approved Downtown Action Plan. Complete cost 
information on the various elements of the Hamilton Gore was not 
submitted. In fairness to the administrators, the duToit study had 
stated in no uncertain terms that the study recommendations should 
be considered as guidelines to be modified in accordance with the 
architectural style of the downtown Gore area. Each city 
councillor was given a copy of the study, and therefore should not 
59 Sicoli and Johnston, "whodunit" p.A7 
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j have been astonished that the final plan had deviated from duToit#s 
original concept. Nevertheless, without accurate and proper 
| updated continuous information, political decisions and judgements 
p were poorly executed or could not be made.60 
' The absence of proper, relevant information was evident in the 
r elimination of the underground washrooms. Council was aware of the 
this recommendation and supported it. However, they were not 
I informed of the two buildings which were erected over them and 
_ later demolished. The buildings were in the final plans, along 
with an infinite amount of technical information on this section of 
P the park. According to Mr. McCulloch, the details of the plan were 
not given in a manner that would allow the politicians to 
I "" comprehend it. A politician should view plans in the "big picture" 
and the administrators should facilitate this approach by clearly 
explaining to city council any esoteric data. 
r Communication problems also developed over construction on the 
roads and sidewalks. The main problem with this part of the 
I project pertained to the tendency of the interlocking bricks to 
upheave. The Planning and Development Committee was informed of 
I this problem only months after its occurrence in a technical report 
p prepared by the engineering staff and a hired consultant. It 
explicitly and unequivocally stated that a certain period of time 
P should pass before any form of automobile may drive on the bricks, 
but it was not brought to the committee's attention. The truth of 
[ the matter is that the staff failed to raise the issue because the 
60 Interview, Hinkley 
I Hamilton Street Railway company adamantly opposed any stoppage of 
transit in the Gore area for a considerable amount of time. The 
1 city staff admitted that they were coerced into recommending the 
an immediate continuance of public transit traffic on the bricked 
! streets. If the committee was cognizant of the reports strict 
P recommendations, the buses would have been prevented from operating 
in the section, with a possible re-routing of transit. To 
! exacerbate the problem, staff also made the decision to have the 
p, interlocking bricks for the roads and sidewalks, which eventually 
1 had to be replaced, laid over fine sand instead of into concrete. 
H1 The decision of omitting the Planning department from the 
final plans was a critical mistake. The city's chief 
j ^ administrative officer, who set up the staff co-ordinating 
committee headed by Mr. Kowalski, says he had believed initially 
s that the planning staff needed to be used only in the planning 
p stages of the project. However, Mr. Sage realized the department 
should have been included in the entire project to ensure overall 
design integrity of the implementation.61 Conversely, the 
administrators are quick to blame the politicians for some of the 
i mishaps. Mr. Kowalski commented "we could have reviewed it in 
p greater detail but it probably would not have been done this year. 
I was directed to expedite it; I expedited it. Everyone on the 
committee worked their butts off to expedite it."62 
Employment security for Mr. Sage, Mr. Kowalski and city 
61 Sicoli, "Gore Park", p.B2 
62 Sicoli and Johnston. "WHODUNIT?" p.A7-A8 
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F architect David Freeman was in serious jeopardy following the 
stoppage in construction. Alderman Mike Davison asked for a 
personnel committee to examine the wisdom and affordability of 
m continual employment of the three senior staff members.63 The 
inquiry was also demanded to determine the question of the trio's 
F* accountability and communications with city council during the 
i 
project. The trio were spared their jobs however, at the expense 
I of being publicly humiliated. Yet, the city staff never had to 
m, officially explain the actions of the administration. There was 
i 
a recommendation that at least three staff members that were 
I* involved in the implementation stage of the project, and the CAO 
report to a special committee to account for some of the 
j N administration's actions. City Council, however, did not agree 
with this recommendation and it was voted down. The rationale 
1 behind this was that the politicians had the final say, so the 
P1 fault should lie with them. Interestingly, Council did receive 
i 
personally written correspondence from the city staff. These were 
f compiled by Lou Sage who claimed that the essence of the letters 
stated there was no cover up on how the decisions were made. 
1 Unfortunately, the letters were never publicly revealed because, 
m according to Mr. Sage they deal with a personnel matter. 
An inquiry to determine what went wrong, problematic areas in 
i staff-council relations and render possible blame was also proposed 
by alderman Hinkley. It was rejected on fiscal grounds but, 
63 Bill Johnston and Michael Davis "Gore Park Trio Spared", Hamilton 
Spectator 5 January 1984 P.A7 
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P according to Mr. Hinkley, the members of council knew that a public 
1 
inquiry would find certain staff personnel and politicians 
| negligent.64 
p, A great deal of criticism was steered toward the Parks and 
Recreation Committee and especially its chairman, alderman Hinkley. 
P The project, however, was not initiated by the committee, nor was 
it completely under its control. Still as a chairman of a 
committee, he had a responsibility of maintaining strong 
_, communication lines with the committee members and administrative 
^ staff. Furthermore, as a member of a committee, one must be fully 
p cognizant of the circumstances surrounding the developments of the 
park's restoration program, especially when the committee's 
I A approval is necessary for implementation. Mr. Hinkely understood 
his role and duties as chairman. Subsequently, if any evidence 
' suggested that he was not fulfilling the duties of the chairman in 
p the project, he stated he would resign his seat.65 
It is uncertain what a investigation would have resolved. A 
I judicial inquiry may have only revealed to council and the citizens 
of Hamilton what was already clear: both politicians and 
I bureaucrats were incompetent or ineffectively performing their 
p» duties insofar as the Gore Park redevelopment was concerned. In 
1 addition, to dismiss the three senior city hall staff members who 
P were most closely connected to the project or to accept the 
resignation of one alderman would have been to overlook those who 
M Interview Hinkley 
65 Ibid 
_ 
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were also involved - or should have been involved. It is also 
plausible that an inquiry would have only instill animosity and 
divisions both among council members and city hall staff. The 
inquiry could have prolonged the agony of the fiasco and Hamilton's 
image could have suffered with such a public self-flagellation. In 
any case, the results or recommendations of a judicial inquiry 
would not have been binding on anyone. The value of such an 
investigation is open to question. 
A fresh new start 
Following the aforementioned incidents a new urban landscaping 
architectural firm was hired to initiate new proposals and be fully 
involved immediately in the remaining phases of work on the DAP. 
They would be responsible for all phases of design construction, 
documentation and supervision of recommendations for the Gore Park 
area. 
The firm of Morehead, Fleming, Corban and McCarthy were 
awarded the responsibility for $54 000, of formulating a new design 
and the other duties. To assist the firm, a new design sub 
committee was created. Representatives were chosen from the 
Downtown Business Improvement Area, LACAC, effected city 
departments (including the planning department)66, the historical 
board and two alderman, from the Parks and Recreation and Planning 
and Development committees. This subcommittee, recommended by 
LACAC, would develop terms of reference for proposal calls for 
66 irhese consisted of representatives of the Planning department, 
Parks Division, Community development and City architect and 
Coordinator 
P the hired landscaping architectural firm. All the information 
would be reviewed from all respective parties to foster open 
j communication and full awareness on the projects progress.67 The 
m firm of duToit Associates Ltd. was also maintained on a per diem 
basis to complete the implementation of the remaining phases and to 
advise on the design of the Downtown Action Plan. 
Public participation would be increased with additional public 
meetings to discuss the new park design. Moreover a special 
committee was created to handle daily construction details (this 
committee was only authorized to order changes within $25 000) . 
The original fiasco dictated that extreme measures be taken to 
ensure that the final product resembled the original plans.68 
Moreover, the Downtown Action Plan Co-ordinating Committee chaired 
by Mr. Kowalski was abolished and its duties taken over by 
the architectural firm. Essentially, the committee had lost the 
confidence of council, and there was an underlying understanding 
that those that were implicated with the fiasco should not be given 
another opportunity. 
As the new plans were drawn up, the citizens utilized the open 
public forums and voiced their demands concerning the park. These 
included more grass and greenery in the park and the need for a 
model to be presented to envision the finished product. The new 
design emphasized an open-spacious concept which attempted to 
67 James Ross, "Citizens want grass back in the park", Hamilton 
Spectator. 5 January, 1984 p.A7 
68 "Gore Paranoia Committee Created", Hamilton Spectator 1 August, 
1984 p. A7 
40 
integrate the surviving elements of the original park with the new 
spacious atmosphere. The Moorhead plan called for about fifty per 
cent less brick than before, and more grass and trees.69 A less 
traditional fountain was moved from the centre of the park and the 
public washrooms were closed because of the financial losses 
incurred in operation, its inaccessibility to the handicapped and 
the increasing safety risk to the public. 
The new plan would undergo extensive and closer scrutiny. 
After being presented to the citizens, the new detailed designs 
featuring and emphasizing the modifications were tabled for the 
design sub-committee and then to the parks and recreation 
committee. Following the design's favourable reception at the 
aforementioned committee meetings, it was introduced to city 
council, where it received similar approval from the politicians at 
city hall. 
O'Brien Contracting was contracted to construct the 1.3 
million dollar plan (a modest figure compared to 2.8 million for 
the aborted plan). Construction began in the summer of 1984 and in 
October of that year, Gore Park once again became a park. City 
Councillors agreed that the restored park would once again be 
characterized as the centrepiece of downtown Hamilton. Yet, many 
politicians believe that the park has not reached its full 
potential. Maintenance work continues on the park, plus more 
projects and activities are planned for the park. Notwithstanding 
this, the major success of the new Gore Park is its simplicity. It 
69 Ross, "Grass back in the park" p.A7 
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has maintained its tradition as a focal point of the city and the 
abundance of grass, trees and shrubs provides an interesting 
contrast to the commercial and city architecture. However, at a 
final cost of 3.5 million dollars the question of fiscal 
responsibility is raised along with the many others concerning city 
staff-politicians relations. 
Since the Gore Park incident, members of council have been 
more vigilant and have assumed a role of the administrator to a 
larger extent. An executive committee composed of four alderman 
and the mayor has been established. The former are nominated by 
the mayor and ratified by city council. There does not exist any 
list of formal qualifications to be appointed to the committee, yet 
chosen alderman are situated in key wards having valuable 
experience. Their responsibilities includes reviewing all 
committee reports, forwarding recommendations on issues which 
overlap standing committees jurisdictions and maintaining contact 
with private boards - such as the football Hall of Fame. They also 
have complete control over the capital budget which includes all 
major projects. Department heads and deputy department heads must 
report to the committee. The committee, however, has yet to 
establish the power it desires, such as selection of personnel and 
power over its own finances. Conversely, the committee members 
have usually served on previous standing committees or 
chairmanships, therefore, in combination with their charisma they 
have developed a certain degree of power of persuasion. Alderman 
McCulloch believes that as long as council does not maintain fixed 
J 
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P views on issues, they would probably give the benefit of the doubt 
to the executive committee.70 The mayor has been able to use the 
j committee as a forum for initiating issues which he perceives as 
rn essential for public discussion. 
The Gore Park case study has illustrated the significant 
p impediments to coherent and consistent policy making and harmonious 
i 
staff-council relations. Many theoretical questions still remained 
I unanswered. What role should the bureaucrats and politicians have 
— undertaken in the conceptual and implementation stages of the 
redevelopment plan? Could the negative conflicts between staff and 
council had been averted? Are there any effective theories which 
recommend solutions to an adversarial, conflictive relationship? 
It was clear that the redevelopment programme was marred from the 
outset. Neither the bureaucrats or the councillors, alone or in 
combination, were totally aware of their roles to achieve effective 
municipal public management. Hence, the city initially failed to 
revitalize Gore Park and the downtown. The proceeding section 
will address these questions by prescribing varying theories 
concerning the role a councillor and bureaucrat should comprehend 
and execute in the process of developing, revising and implementing 
policy. Moreover, the theories will be directly applied to the 
case study. 
The Bureaucrat/s role and responsibilities 
When assessing public servant behaviour, it must be observed 
that they are confronted by a bewildering variety of competing 
70 Personal interview Mr. William McCulloch 24 June 1991 
j 
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j practices and pressures that claim to have the answer to effective 
i 
public management. This forces the municipal administrator to 
j constantly struggle with and address such concerns as being loyal 
rm and efficient, open and accessible, or aloof and secretive. 
1 Furthermore, he or she must question to whom he or she is 
| accountable? A distinction must be made between formal and 
i 
informal, external and internal, weak and strong, and symbolic and 
j real, types of control over bureaucratic behaviour.71 The 
_, bureaucrat must recognize the need to make such distinctions and 
act responsibly when executing his or her prescribed roles. 
p Responsible behaviour is broadly defined as behaviour in which 
one is able to distinguish between right and wrong and think and 
I N act rationally, being accountable for all behaviour. It also 
encompasses qualities such as obligation, dependability, 
! reliability, trustworthiness and prudence.72 But in a more narrow, 
p governmental sense, responsibility has been defined as the 
following: 
i a nineteenth-century term of British origin mingling together 
the notions of duty, causality and accountability in the 
contexts of some law, a lot of convention, and a dash of 
F administrative culture.73 
When the dictionary and the narrower definitions are combined, 
I responsibility to a public official means the obligation to develop 
and administer policy in a certain manner and to account for one's 
71 Langford, "Responsibility in the senior public service", p. 513 
72 Webster's New World Dictionary second college edition (New York: 
Pretence -Hall Press 1986), p.1211 
73 Langford, "Responsibility in the senior public service.", p.514 
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performance to a specific person or institution.74 The definition 
proves useful because it suggests that the concern about 
administrative responsibility has three dimensions: 1) confusion 
about for what public servants are responsible; 2) confusion about 
how public servants should carry out their duties responsibly; and 
3) confusion about to whom public servants should be accountable.75 
1. Responsible for what? 
i in i ■ ii ii i 
The distinction between politics and administration is no 
longer compelling.76 The public servant often makes political 
decisions through the creation and administration of regulations as 
well as through the formulation and implementation of policies and 
laws. But, "there is no longer any widespread agreement about what 
the extent of the duty is: what precisely the public servant is 
responsible for by way of policy-making and administration."77 The 
balance between political power and bureaucratic responsibility has 
yet to be clearly established. 
The confusion over the issue of "responsible for what" would 
1 74 Ibid 
m 75 Ibid., p.515 
76 Originally the distinction between policy and administration was 
r developed in American government as part of the attack on the 
endemic corruption of public affairs in the late nineteenth 
century. As time passed it became increasingly discredited as 
greater knowledged of the reality of government showed that it was 
P quite inadequate as a description of the working of public bodies. 
I Allan O'Brien, "A Council Staff Team?11, (London: University of 
( ^ Western Ontario, 1985) p.7-8 
77 Langford "Responsibility in the senior public service", p.515 
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not completely disappear if one could clarify the respective roles 
of the public servant. In addition, regardless of how powerful 
public servants are, such power is simply too widely diffused in 
most instances to hold specific individuals accountable or 
blameworthy in any meaningful sense. Power is shared within a 
department through the process of delegation, bureaucrats in other 
line departments, and even with other levels of government.78 
What, therefore, can be done about this continuing confusion? 
Clearly, a public servant can not simply apply a set of rules 
or a book of guidelines to understand his or her role in the 
formulation and implementation of public policies and programmes. 
Nonetheless, the city staff are expected to fulfil certain 
professional management principles and contributions to the policy 
development process. 
The following is a comprehensive list of expectations of the 
city staff.79 Bureaucrats must provide all relevant facts; 
definite answers to reasonable questions; information the 
councillor can trust; feasible alternatives for council's choice; 
information on potential community and administrative impacts, and 
information on costs in financial and layman terms. The staff is 
paid to analyze information and to make policy recommendations to 
the council. Council is not obligated to agree with these 
recommendations, but it has the right to expect that they will be 
made. Council, the CAO and the staff should all understand when a 
78 Ibid p. 516-517 
79 O'Brien, "A Council Staff Team", p. 13 
r 
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j recommendation is expected and exactly what constitutes complete 
staff work. 
} Staff must also be forthcoming with all necessary information, 
rm and not withhold facts regardless of perceived significance. In 
' order to provide the information there must be open communication 
P channels. Staff, through their manager, should communicate 
regularly and systematically, providing all council members with an 
[ equitable and consistent level of information.80 The failure to 
_, divulge information can produce severe consequences. "The 
' preservation of the secrecy cult in political practice and 
F* political thinking is a way of supporting faith in the 
i 
infallibility of bureaucratic thinking and a chance for power to be 
I N used irresponsibly and uncontrollably in the narrow interests of 
small groups of people."81 
The consequences of failing to disclose relevant information 
f» was evident in the case study. In fact the one factor which 
appeared to overshadow the others was the consistent lack of 
I communication and information. Significant doubts surfaced 
regarding these important elements in staff-council relations. 
I Were all the relevant facts disclosed?; was information given on 
m the potential community and administrative impacts?; was 
notification given on unintended or unexpected impacts?; and did 
I staff withhold or distort information on costs in financial and 
so Proulx, "A Team Effort"., p.91 
81 Ivan L. Head, "Governing Sanely", Policy Options,, Vol.10 No.6 
(July/Aug) p.15 
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P1 human terms? The detailed information in the case study 
unmistakably confirms that the answer to the first three questions 
\ is an unfortunate no and a definite yes for the final question. 
_, The non-disclosure by city staff regarding the total costs of the 
1 consultants, not highlighting the significant revisions in the 
p final designs from the original conceptual plans and suppressing 
important facts concerning the use of interlocking brick in the 
] construction on the roads and sidewalks undoubtedly induced major 
problems to occur. Consequently, council was partially correct in 
i claiming they did not understand the dynamics and complexities of 
p the park designs. 
In the policy implementation process staff should use human 
r.
A and financial resources effectively, paying strict attention to the 
nature of the policy. Other duties that the administrator should 
1 perform during this stage include notifying the politicians of 
m unintended or unexpected impacts, and reporting progress and 
results. In Hamilton these important responsibilities were not 
I completely accomplished. City staff did not want the elected 
officials involvement in the implementation process. Co-operation 
[ and team work with the politicians could have plausibly prevented 
era many of the problems. However, city staff were determined to 
complete the project on its terms after it received council 
P approval. A councillor's involvement should not end at the 
approval stage, but the bureaucrats surmised otherwise and 
I continued to oversee the project with minimal consultation with the 
^ politicians. 
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It is essential that all staff members co-operate with each 
other and have respect for citizens' rights. This latter point is 
as important for a bureaucrat as it is for a politician. "The 
increased stress laid in the wider political system on freedom of 
information, public participation in planning, and service to the 
public has encouraged public servants to attach a higher 
significance to such values."82 Local government exists to serve 
the municipal constituents, thus staff can reasonably be expected 
to be responsive to citizen's needs. Just as the staff 
communicates with council on a regular basis, staff should 
communicate with citizens and solicit their views. They must be 
cognizant of public opinion on a variety of local issues -
especially concerning existing policies and programs.83 Municipal 
staff should attempt to 
find themselves acting as brokers or arbiters of conflicting 
local interests, seeking to find common ground and to build a 
basis for action. Staff with good negotiating and human 
relations skills can make a major contribution in this area, 
but in doing so they are also helping to define the issue and 
to determine the limits of possible action on the issue -
critical elements of the local political process.84 
In regards to the case study the bureaucrats honestly believed they 
were creating a park that was demanded by downtown lobby groups and 
Hamilton citizens. The redevelopment plans were available for 
public viewing upon request and prior to council approval public 
82 Langford, "Responsibility in the public service", p.518 
83 C.R. Tindal and S.N. Tindal, Local Government in Canada; Third 
Edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1990) p.169 
84 Ibid. 
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P input was solicited. There were areas in which the public were 
kept in the dark such as the tree cutting incident, however the 
I bureaucrats did not ignore the views of Hamiltonians. 
p All of the aforementioned expectations of the public servant, 
! should be applied with caution and adjusted to coincide with each 
p specific context. It must be remembered that each municipality 
has its own tradition and needs, therefore the principles cannot be 
I expected to apply equally and uniformly everywhere. Basically, 
these points further indicate that there is a great need for 
1 councillors and staff to understand and appreciate each other; not 
p only their roles and areas of expertise, but also their 
limitations.85 
| ^ 2. How to administer the roles responsibly 
City staff also face an assortment of suggestions and 
l contentions about how they are supposed to perform their duties 
P1 because there is no clear consensus on the manner in which 
bureaucrats should operate.86 To discuss the principles outlining 
I the basic requirements of public management performance may seem 
implicitly evident and somewhat truistic, however, the professional 
j and personal values which are expected from a public servant must 
m be unmistakably clear and known to both bureaucrats and students of 
municipal government. 
85 Claudette Millar, "To Reflect Or To Govern?", in Politics: 
Municipal Stvle. A Selection of Papers on Municipal Government in 
Ontario. (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1989), 
p.42 
86 Langford p.517 
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P Local government professionals are highly trained. The staff 
should be resourceful and innovative in its approach to problems. 
( Creative and energetic people are needed to fill leadership 
pn positions. In their daily operations, all public servants should 
• perform with a notable degree of professionalism, good manners, 
p serious effort and high-quality work. "Because their behaviour 
reflects on the agency, staff members should conduct themselves 
j with dignity on and off the job."87 
_ Along with professionalism, personal values are also 
f 
( important. For instance, loyalty to the council is essential to 
f" the relationship. The staff works for the council and should 
1 
support the council in every reasonable way in dealing with other 
{ A agencies, employees, and the media. Negative comments can 
seriously damage the trust on which harmonious staff-council 
I relations are founded.88 Staff members hold a strategic position, 
p from which it is possible to undermine council's policy 
i 
prerogative, and to do so fosters mistrust. 
In addition, other personal attitudes such as political 
neutrality and objectivity warrant critical analysis. The latter 
i attribute certainly conjures up the provision of expert technical 
m policy advice and administration. Yet, sceptics insist that public 
j 
servants inevitably have their own subjective views of what 
j represents good policy and administration. Municipal staff have 
their own objectives and priorities that they want to achieve. In 
87 Proulx, "A Team Effort", p.91 
88 Ibid., p. 92 
f*8f 
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fact, the staff may attempt to control the policy agenda, determine 
what gets attention and (equally important from their view) what 
does not get attention.89 
The staff that were involved in redeveloping Gore park 
designed a park that in their view would have helped revitalize the 
downtown area and created a "people oriented" environment. 
However, according to duToit consultants, the staff did depart 
significantly enough from their original concept and how to achieve 
in attracting citizens back to the downtown. Eventually, the 
disagreement over the design led to the halt in construction and 
hiring a private firm to redesign Gore park. 
The bureaucrat must deal with the conflicting ideologies of 
council members. The most obvious of these is the split between 
conservatives who work to preserve the traditional community 
values, and progressives who believe that change and development 
are part of progress.90 This may inevitably lead to problems and 
poor relations. The partisanship rule has become increasingly 
confused in recent years by the conflicting guidelines put forward 
by various governments on the allowable limits of public comment 
and political activity for public servants.91 
An external factor which can negatively affect the 
89 C.R. Tindal and S. N. Tindal, Local Government in Canada p.169 
90 Gerda Kaegi, "Identifying Leadership" in Politics: Municipal 
P Style, A Selection of Papers on Municipal Government in Ontariof | (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1989), p.121 
91 Langford, "Responsibility in the senior public service" p.518 
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P bureaucrats' ability to perform is frugality. Administrators have 
been advised to consider cost-efficiency when assisting in the 
I development of policy. There has developed a pattern of greater 
mm recognition for the measurement of performance or results to ensure 
^ value for the dollar spent. Municipalities have gone even further 
P by forcing the staff to work with limited resources by imposing 
cutbacks. Frugality can present dilemmas for public servants. 
I First, they tend to focus the discussion of responsibility on 
dollars rather than on the intended policy or programme results. 
' Secondly, when delivering services, figuring out what is efficient 
P and effective is subjective and can lead to contention. 
3. Accountability 
j A When explaining the notion of responsibility the focus will 
eventually turn to accountability. Accountability is defined as 
1 being obliged to answer for one's action. It also entails being 
f1 subject to sanctions for failures in performance.92 In reality, 
accountability is a complex and dynamic relationship between public 
[ officials and a multitude of diverse claimants on their attention 
and their sense of obligation.93 The question that arises is to 
I whom is the public servant accountable? This question and the 
p whole issue of bureaucratic accountability has become more 
prominent and studied by practitioners and academics. 
P Over the last two decades, there has been a growing insistence 
92 Webster's, p.9 
93 Paul Thomas, "Accounting For Bureaucrats", Policy Options Vol.10 
no.l (Jan/Feb. 1989), p.33 
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P* on making government bureaucracies more responsive and 
accountable.94 It is suggested that if the power of public 
| servants increases, then they must be held directly accountable. 
™, Subsequently, municipal staff may be faced with a barrage of 
' demands to answer questions about their performance. Recognizing 
p the full range of controls may make us more optimistic about the 
prospects for accountability. 
I A strong argument has been forwarded that staff should be 
directly accountable to the department heads, the CAO and city 
' council. The council would want the former to appear before it, 
p not merely as experts, but as accounting officers directly 
responsible for the administration of their respective departments. 
I ^ Documents such as spending estimates and annual reports would go 
automatically before council, where senior officials would have to 
i explain, and at times defend, city staff actions. 
m Internal mechanisms of control to protect against abuse should 
be established in response to the misuse of discretionary, 
r bureaucratic power.95 This can be accomplished by establishing 
supervisory agencies, similar to the federal Auditor General 
I Ombudsman and the Information and Privacy Commission. These 
m agencies would then be granted legal authority to demand that 
1 public servants account directly for the performance of specific 
P functions. Other suggestions involve bureaucrats being held to 
account by the self-regulating professional association of which 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid, p.34 
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they are members. 
Public servants have voluntarily recognized that they feel 
"accountable for their actions to other institutions and 
individuals regardless of the fact that this form of subjective 
responsibility may not be sanctioned by law or established 
convention."96 This sentiment would entail being answerable to 
colleagues within their department, to the members of an 
intergovernmental committee, to the client groups which they serve, 
to the media, and to the community at large. 
Finally, a bureaucrat may feel accountable to his or her own 
conscience. "Assailed by competing and conflicting demands for 
accountability, many public servants suggest that the loudest drum 
is their own personal sense of what is responsible behaviour."97 
A concern for accuracy, integrity, fairness, respect for 
professional and a commitment to doing one's duty is a more 
continuous source of protection against arbitrary bureaucratic 
decisions than any of the external controls.98 
The Politician's Roles and Responsibilities99 
96 Langford, "Responsibility in the senior public service" p.520 
w Ibid.. p.521 
98 Thomas, "Accounting For Bureaucracy", p.34 
99 On the political side the organizational structure is less 
cohesive than an properly organized and managed administrative 
unit. In addition, while staff are usually organized in a 
hierarchical and disciplined way, council members may be in various 
degrees of disorganization or indiscipline according to time, 
agenda or municipality. That may make it difficult to organize 
Council-staff relations effectively. O'Brien, "A Staff-Council 
Team" p.3-4 
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P The other essential component in an effectively functioning 
municipality is the politician. Similar to the municipal staff, 
j city councillors also have important roles to play individually and 
™, in co-operation with appointed bureaucrats to ensure that the 
' public will be best served. Because the politicians control the 
P political functions and are collectively the boss of their 
municipality, achieving a sound relationship relies intensely on 
| the elected representatives. In dealing with staff, council 
L 
members must demonstrate leadership qualities and reflect the trust 
I placed in them as leaders of the community. They must recognize 
p that the municipal staff look to them for guidance and support. 
However, councillors should not hold the view that they are both 
N omnipotent and omniscient, and based on the fact that they are 
elected officials, believe they are able to make all right 
I decisions without any additional input. 
p A strong body of opinion favours the notion that the 
politician's role in local government is to set policy and not 
[ interfere with the bureaucrat's job.100 The opposing theory is 
that legislation and administration are interdependent functions. 
I The supporters of this theory argue that the task of formulating 
p policy cannot be completely divorced from administration, because 
knowledge of the problems involved in administration frequently 
P influences the course of policy. Moreover,: 
rather than having them operate independently of each other, 
P the means should be provided whereby the legislator and the 
100 This idea was the product of a civic reform movement in the 
United States at the turn of the century. Ibid.f p.5 
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administrator can develop a close working relationship in 
which each contributes to the formulation of policy, although 
the ultimate responsibility for decision would remain with the 
legislator.101 
A host of local issues and problems must be approached broadly 
where the range of options tend to expand, because the consequences 
widen. Thus, to make effective policy decisions council will need 
to solicit the help of staff to provide expert advice. 
Council members can devise better policy if they know what the 
consequences of that policy will be. Councillors usually do not 
possess this information and the expert knowledge pertaining to 
technical matters such as engineering, planning or social work. 
Municipal councillors cannot really judge the administrative 
ramifications of each proposed policy alternative unless they have 
good contacts or links with those officials who will have to 
* administer the policy once made.102 Therefore, politicians should 
not ignore the advice given by staff. Council members should 
consider and read staff reports with an open mind. When council 
believes that information is lacking, it should not be hesitant to 
ask staff for further data. 
City politicians are able to input vital wisdom into the 
policy making process. They should bring forward the views of 
their constituents and their own political judgement. This will 
mean that sometimes staff recommendations will not be accepted. 
The administrators need to know what the politicians intended when 
f "N 1Oi T.J. Plunkett, Urban Canada, p.13 
102 Higgins, Local and Urban Politics, p. 124 
57 
formulating policy, so that not only the letter of the policy but 
its nature can be implemented. Staff members cannot properly 
implement policy unless they fully understand it, and it is the 
responsibility of council to make certain that this is the case. 
The intent of council policy should be stated clearly and 
unambiguously. Councillors intentions can be additionally 
clarified by setting priorities. When the volume of work exceeds 
available staff time, the council should establish priorities and 
authorize external assistance if necessary. 
The Hamilton politicians failed in executing the 
aforementioned responsibilities in the Gore Park redevelopment 
plan. The politicians never succinctly or clearly articulated what 
its priorities were throughout the policy process. The politicians 
were preoccupied with poor employment and economic conditions to 
thoroughly deliberate and debate the projects proposals. They 
allowed the staff to determine the priorities based primarily from 
the consultant's report. When city council received the staff's 
new design plans for the park, the politicians failed to ask for 
more information that would had made the plan's design less 
confusing. This mistake was exemplified by city council's failure 
to at least suggest a model representation of the final plan be 
constructed in order to fully appreciate the scale and implications 
of the project. 
During the construction of the park, city council appeared 
indifferent to the developments until public opinion opposed the 
new design. When the redevelopment of the park neared completion 
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city council claimed they had no idea that the park would 
eventually be engulfed by concrete structures, because they were 
alleged to be mislead by the bureaucrats. Even if this statement 
was true, the elected politicians did not attempt to prevent the 
incident from happening. The elected officials exhibited a lack of 
leadership and sensitivity to the views of other local interest 
groups besides the downtown merchants and the BIA. 
As for administration, it has been argued that staff should 
not be disrupted in their work by a politician's intrusions. If 
such was the case, then the bureaucrat should be fully responsible 
or accountable for the policy implementation results. However, 
when problems emerge because of an administrative error the 
politicians are usually held accountable at the next election. 
Councillors are elected to govern and are ultimately responsible to 
the citizenry for the conduct of local affairs—that includes 
policy and administration. In the final analysis it is the 
politician and not the administrator who is responsible to the 
public for both the formulation and the administration of policy. 
Responsibility for administration can be exercised by giving 
instructions to the staff in a manner that accords with the 
principles of the council/manager system. This entails council 
working as a team. Assignments should be directed to the manager 
and should originate in a consensus of the council, not with 
individual members. Council and staff should work together and 
support and encourage team-building activities.103 Council members 
103 Proulx, "A Team Effort", p.94 
[ should contact staff directly only when the purpose is to 
communicate information - eg. to report on conditions or describe 
[ a problem. 
p Council can also systematically monitor the key staff 
positions with regular performance evaluation appraisals. 
P Moreover, staff members are more likely to perform well if they 
feel that excellence is expected from them, and council will 
| recognize and support such work by utilizing an appraisal system. 
™ However, many politicians are unaccustomed and unqualified to 
1 perform appraisals. For this reason counsellor should be educated 
P in the operations of civic administration. 
Municipal politicians should not try to enforce their views on 
I ^ how a public servant should carry out their duties, but should have 
a thorough understanding of municipal public administration. 
1 Council must respect the lines of authority in the administration. 
F» "If the Council and the CAO have developed a good relationship, 
then the CAO can help the councillors to understand the 
administrative side, its needs, it problems and its challenges."104 
Job evaluation should also be implemented to include city 
! council. They should periodically evaluate its own effectiveness, 
m communication, roles, expectations and team work. Self-evaluation 
may be difficult, but it can create a more effective council. By 
| putting into motion the performance evaluation procedure, each 
party will gain respect for each others' responsibilities and the 
| stressful environments in which they must function. It will also 
I m O'Brien, "A Staff Council Team", p.7 
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P be useful in overcoming the unannounced difficulties that can 
obstruct a good working relationship. 
\ One of the vital responsibilities of an elected official is 
— hiring the administrative staff. In hiring a manager, a CAO, or in 
some cases department heads, council is taking responsibility for 
r administration. These key positions need to be filled by people 
who comprehend the complexities and dynamics of municipal 
I government. Council should be willing to pay a competitive wage so 
that the best possible staff can be hired and retained. The 
' council should also support open and competitive recruitment when 
p it is clear that quality will be compromised by a strict policy of 
promoting from within.105 
j ^ Bureaucrats need to know a wide range of functions. A CAO is 
criticized in public by their political bosses. Council members 
I are not explained the complexities of a large organization such as 
p city administration and special problems of public sector 
management.106 Councillors should not be so unfair and unethical 
ran) 
1 as to criticize in public members of staff who cannot defend 
themselves in public.107 
| When the construction of the park was halted and eventually 
m> demolished, city council again behaved wrongly and irresponsibly. 
There harsh public comments against the staff were extremely 
105 Proulx, "A Team Effort", p.93 
106 Allan O'Brien, "Council-Manager Relations", (London: University 
of Western Ontario, 1984)p.6 
107 O'Brien, "A Staff Council Team", p.13 
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F" unethical and unjust. Openly criticizing the three main directors 
proved to exacerbate staff-council relations and facilitate the 
r,
mistrust that emerged between them. Moreover, it was exceptionally 
_ unfair to primarily fault the bureaucrats for the mistakes. Only 
' a few brave and politicians decided to accept blame for the fiasco. 
p This minority recognized that council as a whole did not fulfil 
their duties as elected officials. They were easily convinced by 
j the city staff that the design would accomplish the goal of making 
the park more people oriented and that a model or alternative park 
1 designs - customary items in a major project such as this - were 
P* unnecessary and a time delay to the completion of the project. 
The case study discussion outlined the problems associated 
I ^ with staff-council relations in the policy procedure. This 
realistic picture of how and why problems occurred within the 
( municipal organization may appear quite discouraging. However, the 
p» mistakes have been noted and there is no reason why conditions can 
be improved. In addition to the prescribed roles of the 
J bureaucrat and politicians the following recommendations can assist 
in the development of a successful and effective council-staff 
[ relationship. 
m, Firstly, municipalities must delineate and allocate the 
respective roles to the politicians and administrators. Each must 
P understand the roles to perform and what is expected from them. 
Each party must fully appreciate the numerous stages involved in 
[ the policy-making process. A candid exchange between councillors 
_ and staff as to what they perceive as the various stages in the 
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municipal policy-making process and to what extent and in what ways 
each believe that they should be involved in these stages should be 
frequently arranged. Undoubtedly, these meetings should at the 
very least encourage constructive staff-council inter-action. In 
addition, a program of periodic training for senior staff and 
council should be introduced to cover such topics as: city 
structure and organization, team-building strategy, interpersonal 
skills, rules of meetings and departmental responsibilities and 
competencies. An annual team building and orientation workshop 
would allow city senior management and politicians to focus in on 
areas that require attention. Being removed from the pressures of 
immediacy, the participants can investigate an assess goals, 
A objectives and some quality planning. An annual event of this 
nature can renew enthusiasm and energy, keeping the organization 
dynamic and fresh. 
' Other actions may include promoting the receptive acceptance 
of new ideas and develop a process so that good ideas can be put 
forward for council consideration. Internally, the bureaucracy 
should develop an overall strategic plan and framework within which 
to integrate all of the planning components on specific projects 
, (eg. budget, department reports, city official plan). The format 
and membership of Committees and the procedure and management of 
meetings require examination. 
Informal communication, particularly between the standing 
committee and the city staff, is an element that can reduce 
■y 
, misunderstandings. Those in a leadership position can often 
P^B 
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resolve potential problems before they surface. Informal 
communication must be practiced among senior management and the 
councillors. When people do not take the time to make a phone-call 
at their office or at home to simply relay information, a gap of 
information can often result in unnecessary and needless division 
of opinion. 
These recommendations are not the panacea for errorless 
policy-making, nevertheless the establishment of these strategies 
will stand to ensure improving staff-council relations and an 
efficient and effective form of municipal policy making. These 
suggestions emphasize the concept of team-work, since it is not 
only up to the CAO and the staff to manage the relationship, but 
also to the council to ensure that their contact with the key 
senior employees are frequent, substantive and honest. 
Certainly, the outlined responsibilities and roles of the 
politicians and staff does not cover every possible contingency. 
But, it can serve as a basis for ascertaining the expectations of 
each party. It has been clearly purported that if a municipality 
is to effectively carry out its responsibilities to its community, 
a harmonious, role-oriented relationship must exist between staff 
and council. Managing a local government is a joint responsibility 
of the elected politicians and the administrative staff. When one 
or both of the municipal actors fails to incorporate these roles 
into their daily assignments, unhealthy conflict and mistrust will 
develop. 
IJBfl 
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Mr. David Godley 
Planning Department 
City of Band 1 ton 
City Ball 
71 Main Street West 
P.O. Box 2040 
Hamilton, Ontario 
L8N 3T4 
Dear David: 
jn response to your telephone call, the following letter outlines a 
cost estimate for consultanting fees required to prepare contract 
documents and oversee construction of the streetscape improvements 
to the Gore Park area. 
Normally consulting fees are indexed to the construction cost. 
Using this method of fee calculation, the consulting fee for the 
total Gore Park area at $2,800,000. at 6% would be $168,000. It 
would not be cost effective for the City to do this, since the plan 
is intended to be built in stages and also large portions of the 
plan are repetitive in detail and need not be repeated on a block by 
block basis. A more efficient way to use consultants in this case 
would be to separate their services and utilize them on a component 
basis. For a construction project of this type, consulting fees are 
usually viewed on the following basis: 
o Design Development 
o Contract Documents and 
Tendering 
o Site Supervision 
40% 
40% 
20% 
AflAaiee aimRopei OulM Atcfwrcu lcxor«o 
dvlat Eo-TOnton and Punning Srnncel Inirmaienst 
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Where at is logical for the City to perform some of these tasks, it 
would be efficient to do so. With this in mind, we recommend that 
consultants be retained on the following basis for the Gore Park 
Area, Phase One: 
1. Sidewalk Areas 
o Design Development (consultants, review by City) 
(40% of $800,000.00 g 6% = 519,000.00). 
o Contract Documents (City, review by consultants) 
pel diem rates (upset of $5,000.00) 
o Site Supervision (City, consultants "on call") 
per diem rates (upset of 55,000.00) 
Total Proposed Consulting Fee for Sidewalk Areas; $29,000.00 
2. Gore Park Islands 
o Design Development (consultants, review by City) 
(40% of 1,000,000.00 § 6% = S24,000.00) 
*o Contract Documents (consultants, review by City) 
(40% of 1,000,000.00 § 6% = $24,000.00) 
o Site Supervision (City, consultants "on call") 
per diem rates (upset of $7,500.00) 
ratal Consulting Fee for Gore Park Islands; $55,500.00 
Total Consulting Fee for Gore Fark Area, Phase I: $84,000.00 
With the shared consulting services provided for the above tasks, it 
is likely that the City having gone through this first phase, would 
be able to continue any further development for the remainder of 
Downtown, with only a minor advisory input from the consultants. 
Another approach to this situation is to hire consultants to do 
studies of construction details for universal use in all sidewalk 
areas. This would provide the City with standardized construction 
details and specifications which could be adapted to each 
construction phase. My estimate for this type of study would be in 
the order of $20,000. and could be completed in two to three '. 
months. At the completion of a study of this type, the City could 
undertake the tasks as described in the first option, with respect 
to sidewalk areas. The Gore Park Islands would be handled as in the 
first option, since the design and details are unigue to those sites 
and not repetitive. 
- 3 -
With respect to timing, the first approach described would enable construction to begin during mid-1983, while the second approach voulllikely delay construction until the fall of 1983 or more 
realistically, early 1984. 
Therefore, to summarize, the first approach outlines a series of £ flasks by the City and consultants; it would cost roughly SB^OOo! in coining fees; and the consultants would be involved 
in all stages of the process. 
could'not be handled within a standardized approach.. 
It has been our experience that the first approach guarantees a 
^ oetter product, since most municipal public works departments are 
generally not experienced with the design and construction 
^ techniques recommended in the Action Plan. 
I Jtrrsr ■• 
during the various stages of implementation. 
We would be pleased to discuss these estimates in greater det.il 
when your funding resources are further clarified. 
yours sincerely, 
DO TOIT ASSOCIATES LTD. 
John Billier 
JH/cr 
SUMMARY QP'COSTS FOR 
(First Stage) 
(Traffic Signals) $2^873^866^00. 
(Street-Related) $1,020,250.00 
(Mleys, service lane related) ^ ^470^51^0 
5fif 384, 417^00. 
a. 
